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I. Introduction 
 
In the introduction to the Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty 
(2002: 34) states that ‘Attention, […] as a general and formal activity, 
does not exist’ (my italics). This paper examines the meaning and truth 
of this difficult and surprising statement, along with its implications for 
the account of perception given by theorists such as Fred Dretske 
(1988) and Christopher Peacocke (1983). In order to elucidate 
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological account of human perception, I 
will present two alternative models1 of how attention might be thought 
to operate. The first is derived from the works of the aforementioned 
theorists and is, I argue, based upon a largely inaccurate computational 
or mechanistic understanding of the mind. The second is drawn from 
the works of Merleau-Ponty and cognitive scientist and philosopher, 
Alva Noë, and takes into account recent neurological theories 
concerning the role of attention in human consciousness. On the basis 
of these models I will argue that attention is an essential, rather than 
incidental, characteristic of consciousness that is constitutive of both 
thought and perception, and which cannot be understood in terms of 
the independent faculty or ‘general and unconditioned power’ (ibid. 
31) that Dretske et al’s account requires. I will conclude by considering 
two potential counterexamples to my argument, and evaluating the 
threat that these pose to the phenomenological model. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 The term ‘model’ is intended to mean a simplified description or framework, and 
should not be taken to beg any important questions about the nature or basis of 
consciousness (for example, that it is reducible to a set of physical processes). 
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II. Two Models of Perception 
 
Much of the recent literature in philosophy of mind and consciousness 
(for example: Dretske 1988, 2004; Peacocke 1983, 1998; Ayer 1973) 
adopts a particular account of the functioning of perception and 
attention. This account is directly descended from the views of 
Descartes, Hume and Locke, and to a certain extent reflects various 
widely held prejudices and opinions about the nature of the human 
body and the world in general; i.e. that they are fundamentally physical 
in nature. This view is also substantially influenced by the modern 
understanding of mechanism, and in particular the workings of 
mechanical devices such as the camera and audio or video recorders, as 
well as more recently – but perhaps even more significantly – the 
modern digital computer with its microprocessor ‘brain’. Such devices 
employ a process by which initial inputs (light rays, sound waves, 
electrical impulses, etc.) are captured by some kind of sensory surface (a 
photographic plate, microphone diaphragm, magnetic tape, CCD 
sensor) and transformed into a covariant representation of the original 
signal that is stored for subsequent analysis or retrieval. Due to its 
relative simplicity and the obvious analogy between the workings of 
such devices and our own sensory apparatus – the eyes, ears, skin and so 
on – this model offers an attractive basis for understanding the 
corresponding processes of human perception. Indeed, many of these 
mechanical devices were substantially modeled upon or influenced by 
the workings of the human body – a fact which only serves to 
strengthen the analogy. I will call this the snapshot model of perception 
(cf. Noë 2002b: 2) due to its resemblance to the way in which a camera 
captures a complete image of a visual scene for later reproduction or 
viewing.2 
 
Under this account, visual perception involves the formation of a 
‘picture’ inside our head (the brain being at the centre of what is 
considered to be a primarily computational process) containing a more 
or less accurate representation of the external world. Although we take 
                                                 
2 In the discussion that follows I will concentrate upon visual perception, but the same 
principles apply to other sensory modalities, such as touch, hearing and proprioception 
(inner-sense). 
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in or perceive the entire scene at once, our brains do not actively 
process all of this information simultaneously. Rather, we extract 
various salient features via the faculty or process of attention, which 
homes in on various aspects or details of the scene that our central 
nervous system represents to us. The conscious mind is then able to 
‘read off’ information from this internal representation in much the 
same way as one might read off the information contained within a 
photograph, train timetable or visual display unit. Any redundant or 
irrelevant information is either discarded, or retained in memory for 
later recall and analysis. The key features of this model are that (i) the 
initial ‘snapshot’ phase creates an internal representation of the entire 
visual scene within the subject’s brain prior to any further cognitive 
processing for the purpose of detecting objects, forming perceptual 
judgements, generating an appropriate reaction, and so on (Dretske op. 
cit. 162), and (ii) that attention is envisaged as a distinct faculty or 
power that extracts information from the previously captured ‘sense 
data’ (Peacocke 1998). 
 
There are several problems with this view. As Merleau-Ponty points 
out, ‘In order to relate [attention] to the life of consciousness, one 
would have to show how a perception awakens attention, and then how 
attention develops and enriches it’ (ibid. 31). Since it is described in 
terms of objective physical processes and causal relations, the snapshot 
model can only explain the functioning of attention as a series of 
responses to stimuli, as opposed to a system that actively selects certain 
stimuli over others, as the model itself requires (ibid. 30). Secondly, it 
entails that we represent the world as an array of determinate and (in 
principle, at least) objectively verifiable data, whereas our actual 
experience of perception appears to contain a high degree of 
indeterminacy – around the fringes of the visual field, for example – 
and can even contain logical ambiguities and contradictions, as in the 
Müller-Lyer illusion, for example. Finally, by positing an internal 
representation of the entire visual field within the subject’s brain, the 
snapshot model simply defers the problem of understanding attention 
and consciousness to this inner level in what Dennett (1991: 107) 
describes as the ‘Cartesian Theatre’. Consciousness, in the form of 
attention, becomes an homunculus, or ‘little man’, that is ‘looking out’ 
at the sense data just as we are ‘looking out’ at the external world; an 
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explanation which fails to resolve anything. To account for the 
apparently ‘miraculous’ (Merleau-Ponty op. cit. 30) powers of attention, 
the theory must either assert that the intelligible structure of the world 
is already contained within the perceived sense data, in which case the 
role of attention is reduced to mere symbol manipulation (ibid. 32), or 
that the world itself is already structured this way, in which case it is 
unclear why attention should be drawn towards one object rather than 
another (ibid. 31). Considerations such as these have led Merleau-Ponty 
and other philosophers to seek an alternative account of the nature of 
perception and attention. 
 
In contrast to the snapshot model of perception, what I will call the 
direct access model denies that there is any internal representation of 
visual scenes prior to their entering consciousness. According to 
Merleau-Ponty (ibid. 43) and cognitive scientist and philosopher Alva 
Noë (2004: 420), the act of perception is itself a form of selective 
attention towards a world in which the observer is essentially 
embedded. Rather than being represented within the brain and then 
discarded, the unattended aspects of a perceived scene (e.g. the 
periphery of the visual field) are not actually seen by the subject at all, 
but are rather sensed as a vague and indeterminate presence on the 
horizon of consciousness (Merleau-Ponty op. cit. 78). As I sit at my desk 
looking at these words on a computer screen, for example, I do not see 
the wall behind the desk or the lamp and books to my left any more 
than I see the part of the room that lies behind the back of my head. 
Rather, I sense their presence as objects that I could bring into perceptual 
focus should I choose to do so.3 This illustrates a key aspect of Merleau-
Ponty’s account, which is that all experience is structured as a series of 
‘figures’ against a ‘background’ (ibid. 15). The dynamic tensions and 
oppositions between the foreground and background objects of 
experience is what forms the basis for both perception (ibid. 4) and 
attention, which Merleau-Ponty describes as ‘a passage from 
indistinctness to clarity’ (ibid. 32). However, rather than being a 
distinct process or mental faculty, attention forms an integral part of 
our system of perception and consciousness as a whole. 
                                                 
3 This corresponds to what Noë (2004: 416) terms ‘presence as absence’, and is a 
distinctive feature of the phenomenological account of perception. 
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Under the direct access model, then, the function of attention is not to 
direct the conscious mind towards aspects of an already perceived scene, 
as if viewed on some kind of ‘internal screen’ (O’Regan 1992 in 
Thompson, Noë and Pessoa 1999: 167), but to direct the process of 
perception itself; that is, to orient the various organs of the body and 
senses towards those aspects of the environment that are relevant to our 
current thoughts and actions. We only see what we attend (or intend) 
to, nothing more (Noë 2002b: 5). Our impression of the world as a 
stable and persistent whole arises not from the integration or analysis of 
various sensory modalities as if this were something that occurred after 
the fact of seeing, hearing, and so on, but from our ability to gain direct 
sensory access to the world. Thus, it is not the case that I see the lamp, 
books on the desk, etc., and then discard these perceptions while 
concentrating upon something else. Rather, the mere possibility that I 
could direct my sensory faculties towards these objects is sufficient to 
give me a sense of their continued presence, even if they no longer form 
part of my visual field (as defined as the ‘external horizon’ of perceptual 
awareness (ibid. 78)).4 Whether one calls this kind of awareness 
‘perception’ or not is largely a matter of convention, but there is a clear 
contrast between this and the snapshot model in terms of what occurs 
at the perceptual level when we fail to attend to objects that are right in 
front of us. 
 
Since perception and attention are already directly connected to (and 
indeed part of) the world, which functions as a kind of ultimate 
repository of perceptual information and awareness (O’Regan op. cit.), 
the direct access model does not require any kind of internal 
representation. This has the advantage that only objects within a 
subject’s immediate field of interest need be represented by them, and 
only at a relatively high level of abstraction for the purposes of forming 
judgements, thoughts, and so on. However, since this view is perhaps 
less well grounded in pre-philosophical intuition than the familiar 
snapshot account, a more detailed reflection upon the 
phenomenological structure of perception and attention will be 
necessary in order to motivate and clarify it further. 
                                                 
4 What Noë (2004: 422) refers to as ‘presence as access’. 
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III. The Phenomenology of Attention 
 
Imagine going for a walk beside a mountain stream on a hot summer’s 
day. Looking around, you see water and trees below a clear blue sky, 
with birds circling overhead. The stream makes a pleasant gurgling 
sound as it trickles across the rocks, and you can hear birdsong as you 
walk along, enjoying the feeling of the warm sun on your back. Such a 
description might conjure up (or might seem to conjure up) something 
like a picture one might commonly see in a Rambler’s magazine; i.e. a 
more or less photographic image of what you would see if you were 
actually there. This is the kind of image that would be captured by a 
camera, and is a faithful representation of what we know to be there, 
but to what extent does it represent how we actually see such a scene in 
practice? In reality, we do not apprehend such scenes in a single glance, 
but allow our eyes, ears and other senses to take it in piece by piece, 
much as you might have imaginatively reconstructed the scene 
described above as you read through it. For example, we might first 
notice the movement of the water, how it flows over the rocks, and its 
relation to the gurgling sound that we hear. Then we might notice the 
contrasting forms of the mountains, sky and rocks as our eyes saccade 
back and forth, taking in each detail. We might recognise the shape, 
colour and texture of the undulating masses of leaves on the trees – 
objects that we know to be there, but do not actually see until we 
examine them directly. Thus our experience of such a scene is 
comprised of a host of perceptual events spread out over a period of 
time. Far from taking in the scene in its entirety, as the snapshot model 
might suggest, perceptual experience has a distinctly temporal structure 
that is based on a series of figure-ground relations, resulting in what 
Merleau-Ponty (op. cit. 34) calls a ‘perceptual field’. 
 
On further reflection, we find that much of our sensory experience is 
fragmentary, indeterminate and incomplete (Noë 2002a: 191). By 
artificially fixing our gaze upon one spot, for example, we would be 
unable to pick out many of the surrounding features, which remain as 
vague and amorphous presences in the periphery of our vision. 
Although we might be able to guess their nature from the familiar 
context, in a more novel situation we would be at a loss to describe our 
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surroundings in any detail, and could easily be mistaken. It is not until 
we turn our attention – and therefore our perception – towards these 
objects that we actually see what is there, and thus gain an overall sense 
of the scene before us (ibid. 10–11). However, we must be careful not 
to stretch the analogy too far. To say that we build up a picture of the 
scene in front of us would be to posit some form of internal 
representation over and above what is given in experience. Moreover, 
there is nothing in our experience to suggest that what we are seeing is 
some kind of image or representation within our own brains, as the 
rocks and trees appear to be over there rather than ‘in the head’ 
(Thompson, Noë and Pessoa op. cit. 187). 
 
Similarly, the fact that, for the most part at least, we experience the 
world as a unified and integrated whole, and not as a series of 
fragmentary or incomplete perceptions, does not require us to represent 
the perceptual field to ourselves in order to perceive it. On the direct 
access model, the objects we see gain their sense of stability and 
persistence not from any internal picture, but from the characteristic 
ways in which their appearance changes in response to the movements 
of our eyes and body (ibid. 55; Noë 2004: 423), and from the 
knowledge that if our gaze were to return to them then they would still 
be there. In other words, the possibility of direct access to our 
surroundings via our bodily senses is sufficient to give us the sense of 
integration and embeddedness that we all take for granted, and to 
assure us that objects will not cease to exist when we turn away from 
them. No additional form of representation is necessary. 
 
Another notable feature of perception is that we are not drawn as 
quickly, or as strongly, to every aspect of our environment. Rapidly 
changing or moving stimuli typically attract our attention more than 
static or slowly moving ones (Noë and O’Regan 2000); difference more 
than sameness; edges and textures more than flat surfaces; and so on 
(Thompson, Noë and Pessoa op. cit. 163–4). The characteristic 
‘grabbiness’ (O’Regan, Myin & Noë 1991: 82) of objects also forms an 
important part of they way that our perceptual experience is structured. 
In The Structure of Behaviour, Merleau-Ponty (1983: 7) uses the 
example of a moving point of light in a darkened room to illustrate how 
an object may draw our attention to such an extent that it becomes 
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almost impossible to ignore, and our behaviour in following it as 
‘appears as directed, as gifted with an intention and a meaning’ (ibid.). 
This and similar cases illustrate the way in which our perceptual 
faculties are directed towards salient features of the environment by a 
set of instinctive or readily acquired motor skills and reflexes that keep 
us appraised of our immediate surroundings. Such principles are neither 
strict causal laws nor biologically predetermined. Rather, they can be 
acquired and shaped in light of the goals and experience of each 
individual subject. Professional sportsmen and women, for example, are 
trained to exclude all other factors and distractions – crowd noise, the 
weather, and so on – that are not directly relevant to their performance. 
Buddhist monks and nuns, on the other hand, are able to train their 
minds to become consciously aware of all perceptual phenomena, but 
without their attention becoming attached to or drawn in by any one 
thing, creating what could be described as a generalised non-specific 
state of awareness. Somewhere between these two extremes lies what is 
probably the normal state for most of us: a kind of restive flitting 
between one object of attention and another, allowing ourselves to 
‘latch onto’ whatever most attracts our interest, whether it is directly 
relevant to our current activities or not. As a result, we are able to 
remain appraised of important changes in our immediate environment 
without having to attend to all of it all the time, instead relying upon 
our ability to notice change as and when it happens, and act upon it 
accordingly. 
 
Experiments that involve the deliberate misdirection of a subject’s 
attention, or extremely slow rates of change, demonstrate that when 
something escapes our attention (i.e. when we do not have occasion to 
notice it), we can remain completely unaware of surprisingly dramatics 
events, such as a gorilla walking across a basketball field (Simons and 
Chabris 1999) or a car mysteriously changing colour from red to green 
(Noë 2004: 420). Provided that our attention is being distracted by 
some ongoing task or event, or that the changes happen slowly enough, 
we simply fail to notice them. These effects are known to psychologists 
as inattentional blindness and change blindness, respectively, and strongly 
suggest that, contrary to the snapshot model, the brain does not 
represent or maintain a complete image of the visual field. If it did, 
then we would easily spot the difference between the changes in the 
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‘external’ world and our ‘internal’ representation of it (ibid.). In 
practice, however, we only take in and remember those aspects of the 
world to which we are currently attending, with everything else that 
remains unperceived also remaining outside of consciousness. 
 
On the basis of the above evidence, the direct access model of 
perception is both compatible with the phenomenology of attention 
and capable of overcoming various problems associated with the 
snapshot theory; namely the need for internal representation, its 
inability to deal with indeterminate, ambiguous or contradictory data, 
and the fundamentally active nature of perceptual attention. However, 
the question of which model is correct is also partly empirical, and so 
we must also take into account the evidence of the physical sciences. As 
Merleau-Ponty (2002: 108–9) argues, this is problematic in that a 
purely objective description of the workings of the physical body and 
mental processes may be insufficient to explain the nature of subjective 
(or inter-subjective) phenomena like perception and consciousness. By 
omitting the very thing that it attempts to describe (i.e. subjectivity 
itself), and using concepts that are themselves derived from subjective 
experience, physical science may simply be unable to give a full or 
accurate account of the ‘body-subject’ (ibid. 105), or the nature of first-
person experience. Nevertheless, the empirical evidence may still help to 
rule out certain hypotheses on the basis of their incompatibility with 
current scientific knowledge, and so the next question that I shall 
consider is whether it is, from a scientific standpoint, plausible to deny 
the existence of attention as a distinct cognitive process. 
 
IV. The Neurological Evidence 
 
In his book, How Brains Think, William Calvin (1988) proposes the 
existence of so-called ‘Darwinian processes’ (ibid. 136) within the 
physical brain by which thoughts and perceptions compete with one 
other for control of our limited cognitive resources. He goes on to 
suggest a plausible physical mechanism for these processes, involving 
the establishment of synchronised patterns of firing between 
neighbouring regions of the brain, with the winners of this internal 
power struggle going on to form part of our conscious mental state 
(ibid. 146). Edelman and Tononi (2000) arrive at a similar conclusion 
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with their ‘dynamic core’ hypothesis, which correlates the contents of 
the conscious mind with a highly selective and constantly changing 
region of the subject’s brain. However, rather than simply equating 
consciousness with physical brain processes, they describe the central 
nervous system as entering into concert with the subject’s body and 
environment in order to elicit characteristic patterns of behaviour and 
thought (ibid. 50). This principle also extends to memory, which they 
describe as non-representational in that the act of remembering also 
modifies the structure of the subject’s brain in a way that more closely 
resembles the practice of a skill or ability than a purely computational 
act of information recall (ibid. 99). Accordingly, ‘every act of 
perception is, to some degree, an act of creation, and every act of 
memory is, to some degree, an act of imagination’ (ibid. 101) – a 
sentiment that is highly reminiscent of Merleau-Ponty’s (2002: 26) 
view that memory involves the ‘reliving’ of experience. 
 
Significantly, neither of the above theories requires anything resembling 
the distinct faculty or power of attention that Dretske and Peacocke’s 
account requires. Rather, attention is thought of as a characteristic of 
the process by which thoughts or perceptions gain prominence over one 
another, either by means of some kind of internal voting mechanism, as 
in the case of Calvin’s Darwinian processes, or by entering into the 
dynamic structure of consciousness, as per Edelman and Tononi. 
According to these theories, consciousness is inherently attentional in 
nature. By engaging in a constantly shifting series of interactions with 
its environment, the conscious subject selects which aspects of the 
world are experienced and brought into conscious awareness, thus 
allowing it to shape and direct its future thoughts and actions. Such 
actions guide and refine the progression of consciousness, either by 
predisposing the subject to seek out further perceptual experiences that 
are appropriate to its current goals and stimuli, or by bringing about 
thoughts and actions that are directed towards achieving these goals. It 
is this process of selection and direction towards autonomously created 
goals and behaviours that corresponds to what we normally call 
‘attention’. Under this account, attention is both partially constitutive 
and an essential characteristic of consciousness that arises from the 
manner in which the conscious mind evolves and adapts in response to 
its environment. If this view is correct, then attention and consciousness 
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cannot be separated because they are both aspects of a single integrated 
system, and not two distinct faculties, as Dretske and Peacocke’s account 
supposes. 
 
These views closely match those of Merleau-Ponty, who states that 
‘[t]he first perception of colours properly speaking, then, is a change in 
the structure of consciousness’ (ibid. 35; my italics). In other words, to 
perceive (or pay attention to) something is to bring it into consciousness, 
thus generating new or altered structures of consciousness. These 
structures are what the neurological theories mentioned above are 
attempting to describe (notwithstanding the methodological difficulties 
previously noted). In contrast to the snapshot model’s passive ‘reading 
off’ of information from previously acquired sense data, the direct 
access model characterises attention as a fundamentally active process 
that is centred upon the goals and nature of the embodied subject, and 
an integral part of the cycle of action and interaction that constitutes 
conscious awareness.5 This is the meaning of Merleau-Ponty’s claim 
that attention ‘does not exist’ (ibid. 34), which is supported by his 
account of the fundamentally integrated and systemic nature of sense 
perception and consciousness. 
 
To illustrate the point by way of a thought experiment, try to imagine a 
being that possesses the ability for conscious reflection but without any 
of the attentional processes described above. Instead of being drawn to 
those features of the environment that capture its interest, such a being 
would be equally and simultaneously aware of all of the elements in its 
visual, auditory and other sensory fields. Its mental processes would lack 
the interplay of mental and perceptual objects that arises as a result of 
the figure-ground structure, and would instead comprise of a 
simultaneous progression of its entire mental state in a manner that is 
more akin to computation or symbol manipulation (albeit of a 
massively parallel kind) than thought as we know it (ibid. 17). Indeed, 
it is difficult to imagine how such a creature could be anything more 
than a passive mirror to its environment, as without the figure-ground 
                                                 
5 A comparison may be drawn with Wittgenstein (1967: §608), who denies that 
psychological phenomena can necessarily be ‘read off’ the physical state of the brain or 
body. 
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structure that is so essential to sense experience, the concept of 
consciousness itself begins to breaks down. Although this does not in 
itself prove that such a radically different form of consciousness from 
our own could or does not exist, it does demonstrate the closeness of 
the relationship between consciousness and attention, at least as far as 
our own thinking is concerned. 
 
V. Two Possible Counterexamples 
 
Two potential counterexamples to the direct access model of perception 
and attention described above are (i) the physical structure of the visual 
cortex, and (ii) the phenomenon of photographic memory. The first of 
these objections is motivated by the existence of highly regular and 
organised neurological structures for detecting movement, lines and 
edges of various orientations throughout the lower rear portion of the 
brain (e.g. Garey 2001). Although the existence of such structures 
might be thought to provide evidence of the kind of ‘representational 
surface’ that the snapshot model requires, current empirical evidence 
fails to resolve the issue either way. At best, these regions form the first 
rung in a series of complex neural mechanisms that undoubtedly 
participate in visual perception, but it is unclear how or at what point 
such ‘signal processing’ turns into what could properly be called 
perceptual awareness. To simply assume that such structures function in 
the way that the snapshot model requires would be to beg the question 
against the direct access model, and so cannot be taken to resolve the 
issue without further evidence and understanding of the precise neuro- 
and physiological processes involved. 
 
The phenomenon of photographic memory is, however, more 
problematic. In such cases, subjects are apparently able to ‘read off’ 
details of a previously perceived scene – a page of a book, for example – 
whilst experiencing the phenomenological characteristics of precisely 
the sort of ‘internal screen’ that the direct access model denies. Such 
evidence could be claimed to support the snapshot theorist’s notion of 
internal representation, with attention as a process that is common to 
both normal and so-called photographic perception. Indeed, Merleau-
Ponty (op. cit. 118) and contemporary researchers, such as 
Ramachandran and Blakeslee (1999), often emphasise the importance 
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of similar pathological cases in providing evidence for the normal 
functioning and structure of the human mind. However, in the present 
case it is unclear whether such extraordinary feats of memory can be 
described as a form of perception at all, since the subject cannot be said 
to see the additional detail either when they are first exposed to the 
scene, or when they are later able to recount previously unnoticed 
aspects of it. Rather, photographic memory is, as the name suggests, an 
unusually vivid form of recall that acts alongside ordinary perception, 
but in which the normal order of events is reversed, with memory 
playing the role that is usually associated with the senses. On this 
account, the existence of photographic memory is not necessarily 
indicative of normal perceptual processes, as the snapshot theorist 
would wish to claim, although the mere existence of such detailed 
memories of past sensory experiences could itself provide support for 
the kind of internal representation that the snapshot model requires. 
However, further empirical evidence would be required to support this 
hypothesis, and since both theories are able to provide an account of the 
phenomenon, this cannot be taken as a knockdown argument in favour 
of the snapshot model. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
I have argued that rather than far from being a distinct faculty, or 
‘phase’ of consciousness, attention is an integral part of all perceptual 
and cognitive processes and, as such, is partially constitutive of them. 
The snapshot model of perception advocated by contemporary 
philosophers, such as Dretske and Peacocke, influenced by causal and 
physical notions of perception, and a computational view of the mind, 
fails to account for the empirical phenomenon of change blindness, and 
is at odds with the phenomenological structure of attention as we 
experience it. Furthermore, by internalising the perceptible world in the 
form of an internal representation or ‘screen’, the snapshot model is 
unable to explain the indeterminate and contradictory qualities of 
perceptual experience, its fundamentally active nature, or its role in 
consciousness in general. Such difficulties are simply deferred to the 
inner level, where they recur one step removed from the phenomena to 
which they relate. Conversely, by conceiving sense perception as 
inherently attentional and directed towards particular aspects of a world 
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within which the subject is essentially embedded, the direct access 
model that arises out of Merleau-Ponty and Alva Noë’s 
phenomenological account is able to explain the links between 
perception, attention and consciousness as aspects of a single integrated 
system which, when acting as a whole, yields the behaviour and 
conscious experience that we associate with living, sentient beings. 
Recent scientific theories, such as those developed by Calvin, Edelman 
and Tononi, show that the direct access model is both compatible with 
objective physical descriptions of the body whilst remaining 
sympathetic towards the irreducibly phenomenological approach that 
Merleau-Ponty and Noë espouse, despite the difficulty of attempting to 
describe the subjective realm of experience in purely objective terms. 
 
In summary, Merleau-Ponty’s denial of the existence of attention as 
something that exists over and above the phenomenon of perceptual 
awareness may be seen as a consequence of his views about the nature of 
perception and consciousness in general, and the primacy of the figure-
ground structure in human perceptual awareness in particular. These 
views directly contradict the mechanistic accounts offered by Dretske, 
Peacocke, and other theorists who subscribe to a causal account of 
perception and attention, whilst successfully accounting for many 
otherwise mysterious aspects of perception, as well as recent 
developments in the rapidly expanding fields of cognitive and 
neurological science. Although the empirical evidence is currently 
inconclusive on this point, the direct access model’s consistency with 
scientific explanation and explanatory power makes it highly plausible 
that attention as a distinct faculty or process does not in fact exist, but is 
rather just one aspect of the highly integrated and systemic nature of 
perception, thought and conscious awareness. 
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